By sheer luck a couple of The Children Legion's members happened to be among the crowd. They were not on active duty and just returned from reconaissance/holiday trip from the seaside, and not even read informing sms about attack. What happened seconds later couldn't be reproduced even if full armoured, alerted SWAT members were in their place. This episode serves brilliantly as an example of distinction between the CL's and other special forces' modus operandi, underlying starking difference between their training. While 'normal' agencies use drilling and teach techniques and strategies to their members to cope with different kinds of situations, it's possible to say that Children Legioners are not trained at all. Roughly speaking, there are ideas and principles, disseminated among the CL-community and legioners are supposed to act as they see fit in accordance to them. After hearing the shooting, confirming through the cries that there are victims among civilians and catching the glimpse of two attackers (the CL's members are usually 15 cm taller than average population of their national-social group), Kayla C. and Medhem N. jumped high in the air using nearby civilans as a footstand, causing significant bodyharm - one had his collarbone fractured, another - damaged spine, three people went in shock. In aftermath comment Indian CL-mission casually mentioned that if presented at the place legioners belonged to A-class team they wouldn't need to use such methods - they would be able to jump 3 meters high from the ground level (Kayla C. and Medhem N. belonged to B-class team). By getting access to the greater point of view and free range for shooting legioners killed attackers with one shot each. (Again CL-mission explained in the statement that A-class member would be able to effectively paralyze terrorists at the same one shot but B-class shooting skills according to the situation were considered sufficient to surely destroy possible threat only and no more).
According to CCTV, everything - from the last AK-47 shots to bullets hitting the attackers, took 1.7 sec. - incomprehensible number from 'normal' point of view but okay for organization that use 'dodici' stat for judging efficiency - how many opponents were dealt with during 12 seconds.
Right after touching the ground (and even before terrorists' bodies hit the floor) Kayla C. shouted in Malayan 'Children Legion! Don't move or be shot!', Medhem N. repeated the same in English. Then they worked their way to the end of the crowd - Kayla C. approached to check if the bodies had explosives on them and Medhem N. stayed behind the first row of people in case of explosion. After confirming the safety, both legioners stripped the corpses of weapons and communication devices and transferred control of situation to the arriving police forces. Again by luck Medhem N. happened to be a communication specialist and had equipment on him elaborate enough to enter terrorist network. Right away through the radio message legioners got an information about next target and ran towards Taj Mahal Hotel arranging the radio station delivery and reinforcements arrival while on the move.o
Contrast between this incredible reaction speed and cumbersome lengthy procedures with clumsy information control of Mumbai official forces is shocking. Nevertheless such efficiency is based on adhering toaforementioned principles. Absence of chain of command and unnecessity of action's confirmation with virtual non-responsibility give the legioners an incredible freedom to act in comparison with other enforcing agencies. The CL puts much more stress on eliminating the possible threat than preventing the losses among population. Thus the necessary course of action during the terrorist attack most of time is to shoot all attackers as fast as possible to prevent bombing, hostage taking, officials' killing and other damages. There are cases when police officers were killed after entering public places in gear and openly displayed guns. No alteration of policy was declared by the CL after these incidents which were described as 'unfortunate', even insignia are not considered protection enough. In some instances legioners even encouraged the stampede to prevent terrorists from taking control of situation. But at the terminal legioners considered panic as much of the threat as indiscriminate shooting, thus demands to stay in place. It's unknown would they really carried out the threat but it's evident that CL-members consider some losses appropriate if threat is curbed in the beginning. Rather cynically the Cl's representatives and councilors discuss that public is more condescending to numbers of victims if the situation is dealt ASAP and death or capture of attackers is announced simultaneously with an information of attack itself. So the the CL's policy is to pay through damages right away and not delay resolution of conflict. Thus it's considered acceptable to harm civilians and use them as shields to prevent the occurrence of more victims. By now the staistics support this approach - attacks handled by the CL have 2.5 times less killed and wounded than those handled by state agencies.